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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE INSURANCE
FUND, (administered by the
Director of Finance) ,
Plaintiff,

vs.

THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH
and MARY MERKLEY
SANDER,

Case No.
10008

D.efendants.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
On the morning of August 4th, at approximately 9:40 A.M., 'Mr. Isabrand Sander was found
dead in his automobile after it had crashed into
an abutment on a 'bridge at 1135 West 4th South,
Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 1.) On August 17th, 1962,
a report of the accident was filed with the U tab
State Industri~al Commission. ( R. 1.) Mrs. Mary
Merkley Sander filed a dependent's application to
settle the industrial accident claim with the Industrial Commission on April 10, 1963 (R. 2), and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
1 provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

hearings were held pursuant to the application under the Workmen's Compensation Act on July 10,
1963.
On August 12, 1963, the Industrial Commission
issued its order in the rna tter. The Commission
f:ound in favor of the applicant:
"The accident occurred at 4th South and
1Oth West. This was no doubt the customary
route to the West Side Office. I't was also
customary for deceased to visit the West Side
Office, not regularly hut certainly occasionally on company business including Saturdays.
"Although we have no evidence other than
custora, we believe that the evidenced adduced
supports a finding that the deceased was on
his way from the East Side Office to the West
Side Office at the time of the fatal injury."
(R. 97, '98.)
'The State Insurance Fund applied to the Industrial Commission for a rehearing of the claim
on August 30, 1963. (R. 99.) The Industrial Commission denied the application in an order dated
September '23, 196'3. (R. 100.) The case has come
to the Supreme Court after plaintiff's Petition for
Writ of Certiorari (R. 101) was grante'd on the 17th
day of October, 1963, and a Writ issued pursuant
thereto.
DISPOSI'TION SOUGHT BY THE
DE:FENDAN·T-APPLICANIT
The Industrial Commission and the deceased's
widow, Mary Merkley Sander, ask 'that the Utah
2
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Supren1e Court affirm the Order ( R. 97-98) of the
Industrial Comn1ission which found that at the time
of his death, Mr. Isabrand Sander was within the
course of his employment and that his widow is
therefore entitled to the benefits of the deceased's
\Vorkmen's Compensation Insurance.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On Saturday, August 4th, the day of the iaccident, Mr. Sander, as was his long-time custom,
arose, washed, and dressed early in the morning
before 7:00 A."M. (R. 48.) There was no indication
that Mr. Sander was not entering upon his usual
working day. He greeted his wife with the words,
"Well, good morning." (R. 48.) After dressing,
Mr. Sander went out the front door leading from
his apartment a't 417 East Third South, walked outside to the front door of the apartment at 419 East
Third South, (R. 29.) :and then went into his East
Side Office which wws located in this wing of 1Jhe
apartment house. In the meantime, Mrs. Sander was
preparing breakfast. (R. 4~2, 49.) At about 7:30, as
was customary ( R. 4·2), Mrs. Sander dialed the
unlisted telephone number to Mr. Sander's East Side
Office and notified him that breakfast was ready.
( R. -!2.) Mr. Sander then returned to his residence
at 417 East Third South by the same route ~and he
and his wife a:te breakfast together. Mr. Sander
did not converse with his wife about his proposed
Itinerary for the day. It was not his custom to speak
with his wife concerning his business affairs, (R.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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50) .
Mr. Sander was an extremely industrious,
thrifty, energetic, hardworking, active and vigorous
man ( R. 43, 44, 20) and was fully capable of taking
care of his own affairs. (R. 50.) They never took
very much time to eat because Mr. Sander was always in a hurry to get back to work. ''I would say
maybe about a half-hour maybe, before he went back,
I would say." (R. 49, '50.)
This was the last time that Mrs. Sander or
any ~other person to the knowledge of anyone saw or
heard from Mr. Sander un'til the time of his instant
death at 9 :40 A.M. caused by his automobile crashing into an abutment 'On a bridge at 1135 West 4th
South Street, Sa1t Lake City, Utah. (R. 1, 51.) This
location was on the direct route which led f:rom the
East Side Office of I. Sander, Inc. to the West Side
Office. (R. 97.) Mr. Moulton, the executive vicepresident of I. Sander, Inc., was on his way to the
West Side Office as he "came down" 5th South
Street ~at about the time of the accident, and saw
but did not recognize the crashed car of Mr. Sander.
(R. 63-64.)
As a general rule and habit, Mr. Sander would
"return to his office immediately" after eating
breakfast in his residence apartment. (R. 42, 61, 62,
6'3.) 'This included Saturdays. ( R. 42, 20.) Other
officers of the company were so certain that Mr.
Sander would be in his East Side Office at 8 :00
in the morning that they would occasionally call
t!here for 'a conference with Mr. Sander 'at 8 :00
4
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A.M. without even making prior arrangements or
an appointment. ( R. 63.) Mr. Sander maintained
extremely regular hours at his East Side Office. He
could usually be reached at his office by telephone
at any time of the day after 8 :00 A.M. (R. 68.)
At a:bout 9 :30 on this Baturday morning, Mrs.
Sander looked out the window and saw that her
husband's Oldsmobile, the automobile in which he
was driving when the collision occurred (R. 24.)
was gone from the apartment. ( R. 51.) The company paid for the insurance on this automobile (R.
22) and also for the gasoline, oil, 1and other autom'Obile maintenance items which could be purchased
on Mr. Sander's company service-sta:tion credit card.
(R. 2'2-23.) Mr. 8ander used this particular Oldsmobile on company business most of 'the time, talthough he also owned a Lincoln Continental. (R.
34-35.)
Mr. Sander periodically visited the West Side
Office to check records, have stenographic work
done, and hold consultations, ( R. 17, 54.) Often he
would not phone or make arrangements in advance
- he would just drive 1down. ( R. 54.) Mr. Sander
had been working on a promotional device. The
device worked somewhat like a slot m·achine, and if
three markers came up the same, the customer would
get his gasoline free. (R. 17-19.) Mr. Sander had
a model of this device with him in the trunk of his
car when he was killed. ( R. 1'8.) Mr. Sander was
aware of a pressing company problem about a serSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

vice station option and highway-access rights at a
location in Fillmore. ( R. 32-34.) There is not one
scintina of testimony or evidence in the en tire record
tha:t Mr. Sander was at the time of his death doing
anything else but going from his East Side Office
to his West Side Office.
ARGUMEN'T
POINT ONE
THE FINDING OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISBION THAT THE DECEASED ISABRAND SANDER
WAS WITHIN THE COURSE OF HIS E'M'PLOYMENT
.A:T THE TIME OF THE FATAL 'COLLISION IS BASED
ON SUFFICIENT, COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
1

The question to be decided in 'this case is whether or not there was 'Sufficient, competent evidence
to support the finding 1and Order ( R. 97) of the
Industrial Commission that Mr. Isabrand Sander,
at the time of his death, was within 'the course of
his employment. Plaintiff contends that there was
''no competent evidence to support the Industrial
Commission's finding . . ." (Brief, p. 5.) If the
Oommission based its Order '( R. 97) on any comp~tent evidence whatsoever, the commission's award
should be affirmed.
It mU'st be firmly stated and constantly kept
in mind that, "To accomplish its salutary purposes,
the [Workmen's Compensa:tion] Act should be liberally construed in favor of coverage of the claimant."
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Industrial Commission,
12 u~tah 2d 2'23, 225, 364 P. 2d 1020 (1961); Looser
6
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v. Industrial Commission, 9 Utah 2d 81, 83, 337 P.
2d 965 (1959).
In Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 5'5 Utah
213, 184 P. 1020, (1919), the Utah Supreme Court
overruled a decision of the Industrial Commision
denying an award, where the issue was whether or
not the employee was within the course of his employment:
" ... Whether a particular injury is occasioned by an accident arising out of the employment may present a more or less perplexing
question, and with respect to which reasonable men may differ . . ."
"We are reminded that our statute requires
that 'the statutes of this state are to be 'liberally construed with a view to effect the objects 'Of the statutes and to promote justice."
"We are all united upon the proposition that
in view of the purposes of such acts, in case
there is any doubt respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should be re'Solved in
favor of the employee or of his dependents
as the case may be." (55 Utah ·213 at pages
216-2'18.)
In order to further this salutary purpose of
the Workmen's Compensation Act, the rules of evidence before the Commission in its hearing are much
more liberal than those which prevail in the courts
of law. Section 3'5-1-88, U.C.A. ( 19'53) provides:
"Rules of evidence before commission. The
comission shall not be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence, or by
any technical or formal rules or procedure,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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other than as herein provided; but may make
i'ts investigations in such manner as in its
judgment is best calculated to ascertain the
substantial rights of the parties and to carry
out justly the spirit of this title."
The Court commenting on substantially the
same section in Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial
Commission, 102 Utah 4'9'2, 132 P. 2d 3'7'6 (1942)
stated that the section
". . . plainly changes the rule of evidence
within the Act . . . Much could be said in
favor of a thesis that the Commission could
,act and base an award upon any kind of evidence; that since the Act authorizes the Commission to receive hearsay evidence, and therefore an a ward may be based thereon. * * *"
(102 Uta:h at page 498.)
The next step in procedure in a Workman's
Compensation case, af.ter the Commission has made
its finding and published i'ts Order, occurs if either
party to the action appeals the Commission's decision. Here again, great weight !and scope of authority is given to the decision of the Industrial Commission.
". . . (B) elieving the facts as related by the
applicant widow and her witnesses . . . is a
prerogative reserved to the Commission, with
which we do not interfere short of arbitrary
action not based on competent, believable evidence. * * *" John G. Hendrie Company vs.
Industrial Commission, T2 Uta:h 2d 80, 81-82,
3'62 P. '2d 752 (196'1). See also, inter alin,
J.B. and R.E. Walker, Inc. v. Industrial ComB
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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mtSswn, 7 Utah 2d 132, 3'20 P. 2d 6'50, 651

(1957).
" ... (T)he Commission's findings are binding on this Court unless it can be shown as a
matter of law that they are so unreasonable
as to be arbitrary or capricious. * * *" Holland v. Industrial Commission, 5 Utah 2d
105, 106, 297 P. 2d 2'30.
" ·It was not in tended . . . that this court,
in rna tters of evidence, should to any extent
substi'tute its judgment for the judgment of
the commission.' * * *" Lorange v. Industrial
Commission, 107 Utah 261, 264, 152 P. 2d
272.
With this background of the Workmen's Compensation Act's purpose, the procedure in i'ts hearings, and the rules for appellate review, let us proceed to the evidence in the case at bar. Plaintiff
contends that the deceased, Mr. Isabrand Sander,
"was in substantially a 'retired' status" at the time
of his death. fBrief, p. 5) This statement is in direct
contradiction to the testimony of every witness who
testified at the hearing. (R. 16, 3'3, 40, 4·3, 4'9, 50,
54, 68, 69.)
Plaintiff next contends that the office which
I. Sander, Inc. maintained at 419 East 3rd South
was not an office at all. On cross-examination, Mrs.
Sander testified that this office had never been used
for residential purposes since 1950. (R. 45.) Mr.
Sander never slept in this office. ( R. 52.) Plaintiff
contends that Mr. Sander could devote as much or
as little time as he wished to company affairs in
this office, and that he did not have to punch a time
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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clock. That Mr. Sander did not punch a time clock
is irrelevant - very few executives do. What is
extraordinary concerning Mr. Sander in 'this regard is the regularity of hours which he kept in his
East Side Office, far more regular, we might dare
say, than the hours of most company presidents.
Conferences were held in the East Side Office regularly. (R. 17.) Mr. Nelson, a company employee,
testified that " ... usually any time we'd want to
con'tact him (Mr. Sander) we would call his office
and contact him." '(R. 6'9.) As to conducting "personal affairs" (Brief, p. 6) in his office, besides
the :Dact that most executives have occasion to conduct some personal business in their offices, Mr.
James Moulton, executive vice-president of the company, testified that to his knowledge Mr. Sander
in fact had very little personal business at all to
perform. "When he was awake, he was either working or churching." (R. 60.)
The uncontradicted evidence cle'arly establishes
proof the company had an East Side Office and a
West Side Office and that Mr. Sander's regular
desk was in the East Side Office although he used
a ta:ble for a desk at the West Side Office ( R. 1'1,
12, 56) when necessary. The company paid the telephone bill at the East Side ~office. (R. 12.) There
was a logical business reason for maintaining a separate office on the e'aS't side of town : the office was
near the offices of Standard Oil, which was the
main customer of I. Sander, Inc. (R. 16.)
1

10
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There was not one iota of testimony from any
of the witnesses tha:t the East Side Office was ever
used by Mr. Sander for anything but business purposes. There was a bed in the office kept there for
emergencies when the apartment clientele might
have more guests than they could accommodate, but
Mr. 'Sander had never slept there. (R. 52.) 'There
was no extension telephone be'tween Mr. Sander's
office and his apartment. ·( R. 42.) I. Sander, Inc.
paid the entire telephone bill for the office at 419
East Third South. There is no evidence whatsoever
in the record that the Company paid the telephone
bill for the 'telephone in Mr. Sander's residence
apartment, as i:t did in his office.
M'ail was regularly addressed to I. Sander, Inc.,
419 E·ast Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah, the
East Side office of I. Sander, Inc. ( R. 32.) Mr.
Sander was paid $1000 per month as president. Mr.
Hosford, the present president does not appear from
the record to be pa.ying the rent out of his s'alary
as president. He is paid $100.00 per month less
than Mr. Sander, $900.00. In sum, this is the office
which the plaintiff terms Mr. Sander's "den".
(Brief, P. 6.) The above brief recital of facts incidental to the East Side Office shows 'the faUacy of
this term - in rac't, judging from the testimony of
Mr. Sander's widow and business associates, Mr.
Sander's character was such that he might have
found great difficulty in finding a use for a ''den"
for "serious or frivolous pastimes." (Brief, p. 6.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Plaintiff admits that Mr. Sander was in "Apt.
14" between 7:00A.M. and 7:30A.M. on the morning on which he was killed. (Brief, p. 10.) Plaintiff
infers that this did not necessarily place Mr. Sander
within the course of his employment, in that we do
not know for an absolute fact that Mr. Sander did
any work while he was in Apt. 14, the East Side
Office of I. Sander, Inc., between 7:00 and 7:30
A.M. This contention is directly contrary 'to the rule
set forth in Edward v. Industrial ·Commission, 87
Utah 127, 130, 48 P. 2d 45'9:
"'As stated in Wheeler's Case, 181 Me. 81, 159
A. 331, fue 'test is not so much 'as to whether
the employer owns or controls the place where
the injury occurred, but rather, whe'ther it
happens on the premises where the work is to
he performed. Ordinarily where an employee is
present at the place of work, even though he
has not started work but is there to begin
work or is there on the premises on his way
to perform his duties, the accident is compensable. This is on 'the theory that 'the course of
His employment must start somewhere. When
he arrives at the place of work, the course of
his employment begins." See also Bountiful
Brick Co. v. Giles, ~276 U.S. 1'54, 72 L.Ed.
507, 48 S. Ct. 221, Affirming, 68 Utah 600,
'251 P. 5·5 5.
1

Assuming Mr. Sander was reading the newspaper in his office at 7:00A.M., and further assuming arguendo that s~aid reading had nothing to do
with his course of employmen't (which is unlikely
in the case of a presi1dent of 'a petroleum distribut12
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ing company), if, as the Commission found as a
fact, Mr. Sander was in his office and this office
was his place of work, he had embarked on the course
of his employment.
Having disposed of some of the less significant
arguments advanced by the plaintiff, it is ~appropri
ate that we advance to the very crux of this case :
vVas Mr. Sander in his course of employment when
he was killed? The question presents no hard ~and
fast means of solution, since Mr. Sander did not
live to present testimony, nor did Mr. Sander set
out in writing or orally state his proposed schedule
for the day. However, this same problem has presented itself to the Supreme Court of thi'S State
and the courts of several others states, and an equitable method has been stated for resolving this problem.
In the case of Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial
Commission, 102 Utah 492, 132 P. 2d 3'76, Justice
Larson initiated his discussion of the case with a
question similar to that above, and then proceeded
to reason forth the 'solution:
"Does the evidence justify a finding that deceased, on March 24th, while in the course of
his employment at the boring machine, bumped his head? There is no testimony of any eye'Lcitness to the bump, and deceased made no
report thereof to the management of the employer. * * *" (102 Utah 4'92 at page 497.)
"Much could be said in favor of a thesis that
the Commission could act and base an award
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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upon any kind of evidence ; . . . The difficulty
in proving the cause of death or of any injury,
where the person injured dies as 'a result
thereof, has long been recognized. * * *" (Id.
at 'Page 49'9.)
'QThe question is whether there is any evidence, competent in a Court of law which
when supported and corroborate dby the hearsay evidence, justifies or sustains the findings of the Commission. * * *" (Id at page
502.)
The Court then discussed the n'a ture of this
"competent" evidence. Like Mr. 'Sander, the deceased in the Ogden Iron case (Id at page 502.) went
to work on the morning of h'is accident. Just as Mr.
Sander ''customarily" dr'ove down to the West Side
Office on Saturdays ( R. 51) and "as a general rule
and habit" returned to his E'ast Side Office immediately after breakfast (R. 4!2), so in the Ogden
I ron case there was testimony that " men . . . frequently bumped their heads on the lever or the
rail; . . . " (102 Utah 4'92, 502.)
After di'Scussing several other facts which the
Court deemed significant, none of which were conclusive, the Court concluded:
1

"We are not prepared to say that the Commisssion could not, from these facts infer and
find that the bump on the head was received
while a:t work at the boring machine ..."
(Ibid.) (Emphasis added.)
The Court affirmed the award of the Commission.
14
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A very similar problem was presented to the
Supreme Court of Utah in Salt Lake County v. lndustl'ial Commission, 101 U·tah 167, 1'20 P. 2d 321
( 1941). The deceased died of Rocky Mountain spotted fever. He had been working for the County in
the canyons clearying brush, but of course the ticks
which cause the disease are found not only in the
canyon during working hours, but throughout the
entire intermountain area at all hours. Justice
Wolfe in this case characterized the facts as being
in near "equipoise." The only evidence that the deceased had contracted the disease while in the course
of his employment was that he had said that something had bit his finger a few days before his death
while he was working and four witnesses testified
to the actual presence of ticks at a point 'three miles
from the place the deceased had been working. In
affirming an award of the Commission, the Court
stated:
"There is nothing appearing of record which
is intrinsically discrediting to the uncontradicted testim'Ony of the witnesses nor is such
testimony wholly from interested witnesses.
Further, the evidence as appears in the record
not only carries 'a measure of conviction' to
the reasonable mind, but is sufficient to throw
the mind off equipoise, raising the inference
that the deceased picked up the tick in the
course of his employment. * * *" (101 Utah
167 at page 173.)
1

1

The applicant..:defendant submits that the consistent, uncontradicted, and overwhelming testi15
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mony of the witness in the case a:t bar concerning
the unusually strong and long-standing habits and
customs of 'the deceased was sufficient evidence to
"throw the mind off equipoise, raising the inference that the deceased [was] in the course of his
employment." (Ibid.)
The C'ase of Dole v. Industrial Commission, 115
Utah 311, 204 P. 2d 462 ( 1949) indicates the extent to which 'the Utah Supreme Court has liberally
interpreted the Workmen's Compensation Act in
order to accomplish its ''salutary purpose." In this
case, the Industrial Commission had denied plaintiff compensation for injury to his eye on the grounds
that the 'plaintiff had not suffered the accident as
he claimed, or that there was niQ causal connection
between the !accident and the injury. The Supreme
Court annulled the order of the Commission and
gran ted the a ward, stating:
~''If the rule announced in the Smith case were
'to be extended to the facts in this case, then
an in'jure'd employee who could not produce
witnesses to the accident might be denied
recovery. The only important 'Similarity in the
facts of the two cases are that in both instances the employer was alone a't the time
the claimed accident occurred, and, hence, had
exclusive knowledge as to whether or not the
accident happened. * * *" ( 115 Utah 311,
314.)
The court then proceeded to poin't out the ''consistent acts and conduct of this plaintiff." (Id. at
page '315.)
16
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Justice Wolfe dissented, and wrote a long opinion based largely on a policy of upholding the decision of the commission :
" 'The findings and conclusions of the commission of questions of fact shall be conclusive
and final and shall not be subjeCt to review;
such questions of fact shall include ultimate
facts and the findings and conclusions of the
commission. * * *" (I d. at page 324.)
The same sense of justice •and ·equity which induced the 'Court to go so far as to vacate the 'order
of the Commission denying compensation in the Dole
case 'Should prevail in the case at bar. In this case,
we do not have an "injured employee who could
not produce witnesses to the accident ... " (Ibid.)
'Ve have an employee who was killed almost instantaneously but who regul~arly, customarily, and ha!bitually went to his East Side Office before breakfast
at a·bout 8:00A.M., (R. 41, 42, 44), ·an employee in
a collision while on a route which would have taken
him directly from his East Side ·Office to h'is West
Side Office at the time of '9 :40 A.M., a trip which
he customarily made on Saturdays. (R. 46.) In
essence, annulment of this claim would serve to exclude from the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act all persons who hold positions which
allow and require that they decide for themselves
where and when their services are best needed in
the interests of the company. There is always the
possibility 'that the employee was in fact on personal business at the time he was instantaneously killed.
17
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He might even keep a log book of whence he was
coming and whither he was going, but to no avail,
for these would be mere self..~serving declarations,
or as p'laintiff terms it ''hearsay." (Brief, p. 20.)
The case of l(;ahn Bros. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 145, '283 P. 1054 (19'29) i1lustrates
the indisputable rule that when an employee travels
from one situs of employment to 1another situs, and
the purpose of traveling is substantially that of fulfilling a mission of the employer, the employee is
within the course of employment. In the Kahn Bros.
case, the Supreme Court upheld an award of the
Commission to an employee who was doing the type
of traveling mentioned. 'The applicant went to his
office in the morning, just as Mr. Sander did in
the case at bar.
'':On the day of the accident, [after leaving his office] , Doe visited the bank, made
his deposit, ate his lunch at home, and had
proceeded from his home toward the post
office, when struck by an automobile ...
He was then on his way, by the most direct
route, to the po:st office, for the purpose of
collecting the company's mail. * * *'' ('75 Utah
1'45, ~47.)
''... [W]Ihere an employee, either on his employer's or his own 'time, is upon some substantial mission for the employer growing out
of his employment ... , the employee is within
the provision of the act. 'The mission for the
employer must be the major factor in the
journey or movement and not merely incidental thereto ... From the undisputed evi1
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dence we are of the opinion that the applicant
was, while on his way to the post office, in
the performance of a special mission for his
employer. He was doing the errand he was
directed to do. He resumed the purpose of
his employment when he left home bound for
the post office and the other offices where
His business called him.'' (Ibid.)
The evidence in the case at bar is indisputable
that Mr. Sander did in fact go to his East Side Office at about 7:00 A.'M. on the date of his death
(Brief, p. 10), thus entering upbn his course of
employment (Edwards v. Industrial Commission,
supra) just as Mr. Doe entered upon the coure of
his employment when he began work at Kahn Bros.
in the morning. Like Mr. Doe in the Kahn Bros.
case, Mr. Sander interupted his work for a few
minutes to come home and eat breakfast with his
wife at 7:30A.M. '(Brief, p. 9.) After Mr. Doe ate
lunch, he began walking towards the post office as
he customarily did for the purpose of picking up the
company mail. Of course, Mr. Doe was not struck
by an automobile while the mail was being handed
to him. There is no evidence in the case that he told
anyone on this particular occasion that he would
pick up the mail after he had eaten lunch. It is
possible tha:t he was not going to the post office a;t
all - on this one occasion he might have decided
to go downtown and do some shopping for himself.
But just as surely as the Court in the Kahn Bros.
case would not indulge in such speculation, so the
Commission has not so speculated in the c'ase at bar.
19
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Mr. Sander was just as punctilious and regular in
returning to his office after breakfast as was Mr.
Doe in going to the post ofice to pick up the company mail after lunch. ( R. 4'9-'50, 4!2, 63.) For the
same reason that the Court found that 'Mr. Doe
was in the course of his employment when struck
by an automdbile, the Commission found that Mr.
Sander was within the course of his employment
when driving from his East Side Office to his West
Side 'Office. (R. 97, 98.)
Plaintiff has not presented even a different
theory of what the deceased might have been doing
a:t the time of his death, although even the wildest
theory would have been admissible before the Commission in view of the liberal rules regarding he'arsay. 'The plaintiff in effect is saying: "You can't
prove what the deceased was doing for one hour
and forty minutes. We don't know either, but since
you can't prove what he was doing for the hour
and forty minutes, the Court must say that the
Commission erred 'an d that the deceased was not
within the course of his employment when he was
killed." If this view were to be taken by the Supreme
Court, it would be all but impossible for the dependent of an executive to receive Workmen's Compensation benefits if the executive were instantly killed
in an automobile accident. Such an interpretation is
manifestly contrary to the intent of the Legislature
in extending the salutary benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Act to executives, and contrary to
1
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the liberal interpretation which the Court has long
given to the interpretation of the Act in favor of
compensating the dependents 'of a deceased employee
and in upholding the decisions of the Industrial
Commission.
In Peterson v. Industrial Commission, 1U2 Utah
175, 129 P. 2d 563 (1942), the Supreme Court vacated an order of the Industrial Commission denying
compensation to the dependents of the deceased. The
Court discussed at length the rules to be applied in
examining evidence presented to the Commission
when the Commission's order is appealed, and one
quotation which the Court made is especially pertinent to the case at bar:
[In Kavalinakis v. Industrial Commission, 67
Uta!h 174, 246 P. 698], Justice Frick on page
181 of 67 Utah, on page 700 of 24'6 P. put it
thus:
" "The commission may not, without any
reason or cause, arbitrarily or capriciously
refuse to believe and to act upon credible evidence which is unquestioned and undisputed.'" (102 Utah 175, 178.)
The problem of the difficulty of proving whether an employee of a company who has considerable
if not total freedom in his methods of carrying out
his duties for 1ilie company :and who is killed instantaneously in an automobile collision has not been a
problem for the Utah Supreme Court alone.
The case of Greenwald, Inc. v. Powdermaker,
21
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Md., 183 A. 601 (1936) is extremely similar to the
case at bar in facts, procedure, and reason'ing. Extensive quotation from the case seems in order in
view of the striking simi'larities :
"In 'this workmen's compensation case, the
'claimant is the widow of Louis Powderm!aker,
who was killed, on May 29, 1'933, in a coliision
between his automobile and :a street railway
car on Liberty Heights Avenue in Baltimore.
At the time of the accident and for many
years, Mr. Powdermaker was employed as a
salesman by Greenwald, Inc., in its business
of selling meat to retail dealers. lt was his
duty to visit such dealers and obtain orders
for meat to be thereafter delivered. In that
service he used his own automobile. According to the testimony in the record, he would
customarily call upon prospective customers
during the forenoon and then return to his
home, where he would communicate by telephone with his em player's office to learn the
exact price quotations for the day and also
telephone customers in continuing and completing his sales negotiations. It was while he
was homeward bound, about half past 11
o'clock in the morning, which was the usual
time of his return with a view to using his
telephone for the purposes just indicated, that
he became involved in the accident which
ended his life. The cla:im of his widow under
the Workmen's Compensation Act ... was
sustained by the State Industrial Accident
Commission, and its decision was affirmed,
on the appeal of the employer and insurer, by
the court of common pleas of B'attimore dty.
On their further appeal to tlris court, the principal question to be determined is whether the
22
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e'l.'idence has a legally sufficient tendency to
prove that the accidental and fatal injury to
the claimant's husband was suffered in the
course of his employment. * * *" (183 A.
601, 602.) (Emphasis added.)
There follows excerpts from the testimony of
both the deceased's wife and 'adult son concerning
the customs and habits of the deceased in his working activities, which the court introduced as follows:
"The testimony of the claimant as to her husband's customary activities as a salesman for
Greenwald, Inc. was in part as follows: * * *"
(lbid.Q) (Emphasis added.)
"An adult son of Mr. Powdermaker thus described His father's business habits as !a salesman for Greenwald, Inc. * * *" (Id. at page
603.) (Emphasis added.)
The court continues:
"The employer and insurer produced testimony from which it could he inferred that
Mr. Powdermaker's last business transaction
on the morning of the accident was the collec~
tion of rent from the tenants of two houses
which he owned, and that he was proceeding from one of these houses to his own home
when he was fatally injured. * * *" (I d. at
page 603.)'
How similar is this to the statement in plaintiff's brief, pages 10-11:
"'There is also a lack of any competent evidence to prove what Mr. Sander might have
been doing after he finished eating his bre'akfast and ?efore the Oldsmobile. he was driving
crashed 1nto the concrete bndge later that
23
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morning. With such l:ack of proof, any finding or inference wHich the Industria1 Commission might make, to the effect that after
his breakfast Mr. Sander went back to Apt.
14 and then later went from there to the 5th
South office, is clearly unsupported by competent evidence."
However, the ·Maryland Court continued:
"But it is inferable from the other evidence
in the case tlrat he had been engaged during
tha:t morning in the performance of his salesmanship duties, including collection of account
of sales, and was driving to his home with a
view to serving further the objects of his employment by the use of his telephone at the
period of the day when he customarily used
that method of promoting his employer's business. 'The commissi'on and the jury conclud~d
from the evidence in the record that 'the claimant's husband, after deviating temporarily
from the course of his employment in order
to make his rent collections, ha:d resumed his
service to the employer when he was proceeding homeward for the purposes of the communiac'~ions which were habitually necessary
in his s:ale operations." (183 P. 601, 603.)
This is very similar to the facts in the case at
bar. It is ''inferable" tha:t when Mr. Sander went
to his East office at 7 :00 A.M. that while there he
was performing some type of work with1n the ambit
of the duties of the president of a company. We may
assume tha:t Mr. Sander was not within the course
of 'his employment while a!t his residence apartment
at 7 :30 A.M. to eat breakfast: he was "deviating
temporarily from the course of his employment ... "
24
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(Ibid.) A~~uming for the sake of argument that Mr.

Sander did not return again to the East Side Offie(', his work day had already begun, and when he
was proceeding to the West Side Office, he ". . .
ha:d resumed his service to the employer ... ," and
was within the course of his employment when killed.
The Court supra, proceeds:
"In our opinion the evidence was legally sufficient to perm it the inference, actually drawn
alike by the commission and the jury, that
the claimant lost her husband in consequence
of an accidental injury in the course of his
employment. * * *" (Id. at page 603) (Emphasis added)
" ... The objections to the testimony as to the
customary routine of the claimant's husband
in the perform'ance of his employment duties
were also properly overruled." (Id. at page
604.) (Emphasis added)
In Brown v. R. J. Brown Co., Mo., 17'2, S.W.
2d 645 ( 1943), the 'deceased was president of a
wholesale dealership which handled "Pennzoil".
Three days before the accident, deceased was told
by his supplier to sell more ''Pennzoil." Deceased
sold "Pennzoil" at three different spots on day of
death, then traded his older car for a new one at
7:00 P.M. He was driving alone on a highway
which would have taken him back to his own wholesale dealer's office. He was alone when killed when
his car collided with a tree. He had not told anyone
at his last stop exactly where he was going or what
he was going to do. The collision occurred at 9 :15
1

1
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at night. The Mo. Supreme Ct. upheld the decision
of the Commission and the Mo. Cir. Ct. 1Jhat at the
time of the <'ollision, the deceased was "in the course
of employment" of R. J. Brown Co. (''Pennzoil")
and his widow was thus entitled to the benefits of
insurance taken out by R. J. Brown Co. for deceased
under the Mo. Workmen's Compensation Act (similar to Utah's) .
1

The finding of the Industrial Commission that
the deceased was within the course of his employment at the time of the fatal collision is therefore
based on competent evidence. The )Commission found
tha;t the actions of the deceased on this particular
morning, as far as they were directly observed, were
perfectly consistent with Mr. Sander's customs and
habits and the fact that he was subsequently flound
dead in his automobrle on a route which would lead
him to his West Side Office at 9:40A.M. 'The arguments brought forth by plaintiff are in essence only
wild theories, could..:have-beens, remote possibilities,
but highly improbable. As the cases and the logical
purposes of the Act show, it has never been the policy
of the courts, nor does it appear to have been within
the purview of the legislature, that well-founded
claims sh'ould be defeated by a barrage of guesses
about what could have happened.
1

1

The case of Sylvan v. Sylvan Bros., 2:2'5 S.C.
429, 82 S.E. 2d 794 ( 19 54) is cited by the plaintiff
(Brief, pp. 15-1'6) as standing for the proposition
of law that "Injuries sustained by executives who
1

1
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slipped and fell on sidewalk on the way from home
to place of employment. [etc., p. 16.] This case is
clearly distinguisha:ble on its facts from the case
at bar, and 'has been so explicitly distinguished by
the Supreme Court of South Carolina in a more
recent case.
In the Sylvan case, "The claimant was in the
habit of doing 'paperwork' including the preparatin of advertisements, in his hotel room, which was
his home at night, and when he fell on the street
he ha:d in his pocket papers of the business upon
which he had worked in his room on the night before." (82 S.E. 2d 794, 7'95.) In 1the ease at bar:
The room in which Mr. Sander did his
paperwork was not his '·'home." (Transcript,
page 47.) The room which Mr. Sander use'd
as his office, never had been his "home".
(Transcript, pages 40-41.)
2. There is no evidence in the Sylvan case,
even had the claimant's hotel room been consi'dered an office as well 'as a home, that the
claimant, Mr. Sylvan, actually did any work
in that hotel room which would place him
u•ithin the scope of his employment on the dtly
and at the time he was injured. Mr. Sylvan
himself was alive to testify that he did the
paperwork in his hotel room the preceding
night. In the case at bar, there is competent
testimony to the effect that the de·ceased, Mr.
Sander, went to his office at 7 :00 A.M. and
1.

1

'l:1
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again at 8:00A.M. (R. 49), thereby entering
upon the course of his employment, after
which 1time he never departed therefrom until
the time and place of the collision in which
he was killed.
In the Sylvan case, it is sta;ted: "Nor is it contended that the corporation paid the room rent 'and
made claimant's hotel room its p'lace of business."
In the case a:t bar, Gregory Hosford, gene~al manager of I. Sander, Inc. at 'the time of 'the death of
the deceased, directly testified: "When we moved
some of the office personnel from 419 East 3rd
South to 181'5 West '5th South, we determined that
we would maintain the office up there, and the question of rent 'came up, and in discussing this with
Mr. Bander he felt - and we felt along with him that the best thing to do was to compensate him in
salary sufficient so that he paid the rent himself.
* * *" (Transcript, page 10) (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Hosford, the present president of I. Bander, Inc.
is paid $900 per month. Mr. Sander, the deceased,
was paid $1000 per month, the increase 'being an
indirect means for the corporation to pay for the
East 'Side Office. ( R. 15, 16.)
The record in the case at bar, contrary to the
Sylvan case, conclusively shows that the room at
419 East 3rd South was the corporation's place of
l>usiness. (R. 21-22.)
In the Sylvan ·case, the opinion indicates that
Mr. Sylvan had an office in his downtown depart28
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ment store, and that "the taking of the 'paperwork'
to his room was, therefore, for his own convenience."
(82 S.E. 2d 794, 796.) Mr. Sander had no
regular desk or place to work 'at his West Side Office
(R. 56) and the maintenance of the East Side Office was not for mere conven'ience, but also because
of its proximity to the offices of Standard Oil Co.,
I. Sander, Inc.'s largest customer (R. 76.)
It should be further noted that all of the cases
and texts cited in the Sylvan ca:se deal with the question, undisputed in 'the case, of a pers'on who does
work at home and is then injured while traveling
to his place of business. The ·case at bar does not
involve the question of Mr. San1der going from his
home, where he did work, to his office. ·The Cornmission a:s triers of the facts found that the room
located a:t 419 E'ast Third South was in fact the
"East Side Office" of I. Sander, Inc. ('R. 97.) 'There
was no finding in the Sylvan case th'at the hotel
room in question in that case was found by the commission to have been Mr. Sylvan's "office". It would
have been "arbitrary and capriicious" for the Commission to have found in the case at bar that I.
Sander, Inc. did not in fact maintain two offices,
especi:ally when sound business rea:sons were testified to for so maintaining two offices.
1

It should be further ndted th'at the Sylvan case
contains a lengthy, well-reasoned, and well-documented dissenting opinion, in which Justice ·Taylor
stated, inter alia, that the award should have been
29
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affirmed because claimant " ... at the time of injury ... was on his way from one place of business
to the other within the purview of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. * * *" (82 S.E. 2d 794, 802.)
The case of Halpern v. De Jay Stores, Inc., 236
S.C. 587, 1'15 s.·E. 2d 297 (T9'60) presents a factual
situation more closely in point with the case 'at bar
than did the Sylvan case. The issue in the case was
the same as that in the case at bar: Whether the deceased when killed in an automobile collision was in
the course of his employment. 'Like the case at bar,
the deceased reporte'd into his office in the morning. ''There was a credit manager of the store whose
duty it was to collect de'linquent accounts. When he
failed he turned the accounts over to the deceased
manager who tried to make collections by personal
visits to the debtors. This was the scope of 'the duties
of his employment." (115 S.E. 21d 2H7, 2'9'8.)
1

1

Like the facts in the case at bar, the case arose
over a dispute whether a;t the time of the collision
the deceased was on his own personal business or
within the scope of the duties of his employment
in going to the homes of delinquent debtors and attempting to collect on the accounts.
1

". . . The credit manager testified that the
deceased, after verifying that the credit manager would be in the store on that 'day, on ~he
morning of the day of the accident took Information cards of several delinquents and
sa~id to the witness, 'Well, I think - I think
maybe I'll get out a little bit ·an'd loosen up
30
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my muscles, relax a bit * * * and (the deceased said) in the meantin1 while I'm out
I can attend to a few things * * * might even
take to a run up to Chester.' The witness
knew that the deceased had ~an acquaintance
in Chester." (I d. at pages 298-29'9.)
At the time of the accident, the deceased had
passed the turn to the debtor's house by 1.2 miles,
and was on the road, possibly headed toward Chester. The Court upheld the finding of the Commission that the deceased was within the scope of his
employment, stating:
"There was no name sign on the Camp Ground
Road, where the deceased should have turned
left on his way to the debtor's home, bu't only
a small sign showing the number of this secondary road. There are many such roads intersecting the Old Winnsboro Road to 'decenden t' s left as he traveled it."
"In the face of these facts, it cannot be said
that the conclusion of the Commission that, in
effect, the deceased wa·s on his way to see the
debtor, and not in route to Chester on a personal mission as contended by the appel'lants,
was without evidence to sustain the finding.
Possibly the deceased was on his way to Chester but he had not reached that point of departure from his duties when he met his
death, according to the information which he
had in the store and in his pocket. The latter
is rather strong evidence that he intended to
attempt the collection of ·the delinquent account although he never reached the home of
the debtor ... " (ld. at page 2'99..:300.)
" ... Nor is Sylvan v. Sylvan Bros., 225 S.C.
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4'29, 82 S.E. 2d 7'94 ... in point, there the
employee was injured on a city street while
en route to war k. (Ibid.)
Again, plaintiff's entire argument regarding
the case of Vitagraph, Inc. v. lndustrml Commission,
9 6 Utah 190, 85 P. 2'd 601 (19 38) (Brief p. 13)
rests on the proposition directly contrary to the finding of fact of 'the Industrial Commission : ". . . the
deceased was on his way from the Eas't Side Office
to the West Side Office at the time of the fatal injury." In the Vitagraph case, supra, the court at 85
P. 2d 601, 605 srta ted: '~This case to be compensable
a:t a;ll must come within the exception that where
the employee, either on 'the employer's or his own
time, is upon some substantial mission for the employer growing out of his employment." The court
concluded that there was no special mission:
1

1

1

" ... In going to his home he was not on a
mission or errand for his employer, nor was
he performing a duty for his employer." (Id.
at page 606.)

In the case at bar, the deceased was not going
from home to work or from work 'to home; rather,
he was going from one office, one place of business,
to another. To say that the deceased was not traveling to the West Side Office for business reasons,
within the course of his employment, would be completely contrary to all of 'the evidence relating not
only to the deceased's business habits, but also to
his partilcular character trait of industriousness.
32
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What has been said concerning the V itagraph
case applies equally to the case of Greer v. lndustrwJ
Commission, 74 Utah 379, 279 P. 900 (Brief p. 15):
the Greer case also presented the factual situation
of an employee going on what he contended was a
"special mission" from his place of employment to
his home, not to another office of his employer, as
in the case at bar.
Again, plaintiff in his discussion of the case
of Jllorgan v. Industrial Commission, 92 Utah 129,
66 P. 2d 144 (Brief P. 16) and Goodyear Tire &
Rnbber Co. v. Industroial Commission, 100 Utah 8,
110 P. 2d 334 ( 1941), rests his entire argument on
the assumption that the deceased in the case before
us was travelling from his home to what plaintiff
concedes may have been his Wes\t Side Office. Whether there was a "special mission" from home to place
of business is the entire question in these two cases,
not whether a trip from one situs of employment
to another situs of employmen!t placed ·tfue party in
question in the course of his employment. As Justice
'Volfe stated in the Goodyear case in his concurring
opinion, quoted by the plaintiff:
"I hope I have shown tha:t the distinction
sought to be made in the prevailing opinion
. . . is not a tenable distinction when the two
cases are viewed as they should he, that is,
from the point of departure from the home to
the place of business. * * *" ( 100 Utah 8
13~14).
'
In commenting upon plaintiff's Point 2 and
33
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cases cited therein, the following distinctions and
dbserva tions seem pertinent. 'The appH cant agrees
fully with the statement quoted by defendant from
the Wherritt case: " The burden of proof is upon
applicant to establish her claim for compensation
... " ('Brief, p. 19.) In thaJt carse the Commission
held that the applicant had failed in this burden.
The Supreme Court merely refused 'to reverse the
Commission's finding. The defendant-applicant in
the case 'at bar has sustained !her burden of proof
b~ejore the Commission, to which this quotation refers.
Plaintiff makes the general statement that all
of the testimony in the case is ''hearsay". Defendant'applicant has 'analyzed case after case, analogizing
the fact situations and the !testimony given in the
case at bar, showing their similarities, pointing out
exactly how evi1dence of a simiiar nature in other
cases has been held sufficient rand competent to sus1~tain an award of the Industrial Commission. Plaintiff rests on a broad generalizaJtion.
1

1

Plaintiff cites Fish Lake Resort Co. v. Industrial Commission, 73 Utah 471, 275 P. 580 (1929)
(Brief, p. 20) on h~arsay testimony. It should be
noted that at least six witnesses testified in the Fish
Lake case that the deceased was merely fishing for
his own personal pleasure at the time of his death.
No witnesses testified in rtJhe case at bar that deceased was driving for pleasure.
1

'The case of Scowcroft & Sons Co. v. Industrwl
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Commission, 70 Utah 116,258 P. 339 (1927), (Brief
p. 20) i'S not in point. The issues in this case were
dependency and the amount of the :award, not course
of employment as in the case aJt bar.

Plaintiff's citation of Vecchio v. Industrial
Commission, 82 Utah 12'8, '22 P. 2d 212 (1933)
(Brief p. 20) is particularly interesting. In this
case, 'the Commission denied an award to the applicant, and the Supreme Court reversed the denial of
compensation. The Court stated a:t 82 Uta:h 128, 136:
"Assuming that all the testimony tha:t could
be by any rule ·classed as hearsay is equally
balanced by circumstances or selfserving and
disserving statements, and what consi deration, if any, may be given to such (and we
think such testimony tends to support rather
than to destroy the reasonable inference that
logically and naturally results from the competent evidence), we are of the opinion the
inference is supported cle arly within ·~he rule
of Cudahy Packing Co. v. Brown, . . . [61
Utah 29, 2'10 P. 608 '(192'2)]" (Emphasis on
first phrase in quotation added.)
1

1

The Cudahy Packing Co. case, supra, which
was followed in the Vecchio case, supra, in overruling a decision of the Commission denying compensation is directly relevant to the competence of the
evidence upon which the Commission hase'd its decision in the case a:t bar, and whi·ch evidence ·the plaintiff assails.
Defendantoo~applicant

recognizes the fact that the
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Supreme Court annulled the award granted to the
applicant in the Cudahy Packing Co. case. Yet the
rules of that case regarding the compen tency of
evidence given in proceedings of the Industrial Commission, when the evidence is submitted to the Supreme Court for review, have been cited with approval in la1ter decisions. These rules regarding the
competency of evidence plainly support 1fue competency of the evidence in 1fue case at bar.
Before discussing the law enunciated in the
Cudahy Racking case, it should be noted that the
award of the Industrial Commission in that case
was annulled because there was not even any evidence from which the Commissi1on's could infer that
the deceased even suffered a scratch causing blood
poisoning, much less a scratch occurring during tile
course of his employment. The Court stated at 61
Utah 29, 3'3:
'~This court . . . is committed to the doctrine
~hat facts may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances of any particul'ar case, and
tJha:t the absence of direct testimony is not
conclusive that an injury did not occur, but
that the Commission ... has the right to make
such reasonable inferences frbm the facts
proven as in its)udgm~nt may be consiste~t
wfth the contention of either party ... In this
case, however, from the nature of the injury,
there is nothing to establish the fact that the
accident from which 1fue injury resulted oc:curred at plaintiff's plant. From the testimony it might just as reasonably be inferred
that ·1fue accident occurred at the home of the
1
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deceased, or that it occurred on his way either
to or from his work. No one saw the cut, if
there UJaS a cut, or scratch upon the hand,
fingers, or arm. In fact, it is not shown that
one ever existed. Until some proof is adduced
showing that an accident happened at the
plant of the plaintiff or facts proven from
which it can reasonably be inferred that such
accident did happen at plaintiff's plant, we
do not see how there is any substantial or any
evidence [sic] save hearsay testimony from
which the inference oan be deduced that death
resulted from an accident in Vhe course of deceased's em·ployment."
Defendant-'applicant submits that in the case
at bar there is evidence which satisfies what the
Court in the Cudahy Packing case stated was laCking.
In the case of Diaz v. Industrial Commission,
80 Utah 77, 1'3 P. 2'd 307 (19'32), ('Briefp. 20) the
Court was confronted with expert medical testimony
concerning the cause of the death of the employee
of ·fue mining company. The evidence in ·1ilie case
is so dissi1nilar to that in the case at bar as to only
obfuscate the issues. Defendant-'applicarrt su!bmirts
that the Commissi'on's findings in the ease at bar
were not only supported by c;'sufficient" evidence,
but that plaintiff failed to adduce any contradictory
legally competent evidence.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant-applicant
requests the Court to affirm the Order of the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah granting
Workmen's Compensation benefits to M~ary Merkley
Sander, wi dow of the 'deceased Isabrood Sander.
1

Resp~tfully

submitted,

GEORGE C. MORRIS
Attorney for Defendants
914 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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